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Open for votingTier APrivacy

ConfidentialTransfer XLS-96

ConfidentialTransfer encrypts confidential MPT balances and hides ConfidentialMPTSend amounts while allowing issuer and optional auditor inspection. ConfidentialTransfer is open for Mainnet voting but is not enabled yet. The latest response reports support from 21 of 35 tracked validators.

Sources reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · English page updated Oct 5, 2026 · Phil · CryptoTuts founder

Status
Open for voting
XLS
XLS-96
Enabled
Not enabled

What is the current Mainnet vote?

21 of 35 yes votes; minimum: 29 (current 60%; support >80%)

What does this amendment change?

Why does this amendment exist?

Institutional MPT applications need nonpublic balances and amounts while still providing verifiable compliance information to authorized parties.

How does the mechanism work?

EC-ElGamal encrypts balances and transfer amounts in parallel for the holder, issuer, and an optional auditor. Compact sigma proofs bind those ciphertexts to the same value; Bulletproofs establish nonnegative amounts without revealing them. Separate spending and inbox balances prevent stale proofs, and the recipient explicitly merges the inbox before spending.

What changes compared with the predecessor?

BeforeAfter
MPT balances and transfer amounts were publicly readable.An MPT issuance configured for this feature can maintain public and confidential balances in parallel while supply and proof rules remain verifiable.

Who is this change relevant to?

XRP holders and users

Holders can send MPT amounts confidentially but must secure a separate ElGamal key and merge incoming amounts before spending them. XRP itself does not become private.

Wallets and app developers

Wallets generate five new transaction types, ciphertexts, and zero-knowledge proofs. They must manage inbox merging, version counters, and an ElGamal key separate from the XRPL account key.

Exchanges and issuers

Issuers retain freeze and clawback options when those rights are configured for the issuance. An optional auditor key allows independent decryption of holder balances for compliance.

Node operators

Validators check ciphertexts, sigma proofs, Bulletproofs, and public supply invariants. The specification assigns each confidential MPT transaction ten times the standard base fee to account for this work.

What limitations and risks remain?

  • This feature applies to configured MPT confidential balances, not XRP or the entire ledger. Accounts, public-to-confidential conversion amounts, and conversion-back amounts remain visible; canonical encrypted zero states are also recognizable.
  • In this version, confidential MPTs are limited to payments between accounts and do not integrate with the DEX, escrow, or checks.
  • An MPT issuance cannot combine confidential transfers with a positive TransferFee.
  • The protocol design supports only one optional on-ledger auditor.
  • The issuer itself cannot hold confidential balances of its own issuance. It needs a separate ordinary holder account for that.
  • Incoming amounts enter an inbox and remain unspendable until an explicit ConfidentialMPTMergeInbox.
  • Losing the ElGamal private key makes the confidential balance impossible for its holder to decrypt or spend.
  • EC-ElGamal on secp256k1 is not quantum-resistant.
  • Enabling confidential amounts is a one-way operation and cannot be reversed afterward.
  • An MPT issuance uses confidential balances only if the issuer enables lsfMPTCanHoldConfidentialBalance and has not excluded that option through ImmutableFlags.

What fee and performance figures does the specification provide?

  • With an auditor, ConfidentialMPTSend carries approximately 1,276 bytes of cryptographic data; without one, approximately 1,210 bytes. Transaction headers and metadata are excluded from these figures.
  • The aggregated Bulletproof is 754 bytes. A Send transaction's proof bundle totals 946 bytes.
  • The specification charges ten times the ordinary base fee for every confidential MPT transaction.
Technical details: transactions, fields, codes and invariants

Transactions

  • ConfidentialMPTConvert (type 85)
  • ConfidentialMPTMergeInbox (type 86)
  • ConfidentialMPTConvertBack (type 87)
  • ConfidentialMPTSend (type 88)
  • ConfidentialMPTClawback (type 89)
  • MPTokenIssuanceSet

Ledger objects

  • MPTokenIssuance
  • MPToken

Fields and flags

  • IssuerEncryptionKey / AuditorEncryptionKey (33 bytes)
  • HolderEncryptionKey
  • ConfidentialOutstandingAmount
  • ConfidentialBalanceSpending / ConfidentialBalanceInbox
  • IssuerEncryptedBalance / AuditorEncryptedBalance
  • SenderEncryptedAmount / DestinationEncryptedAmount
  • AmountCommitment / BalanceCommitment
  • BlindingFactor
  • ZKProof
  • ConfidentialBalanceVersion
  • lsfMPTCanHoldConfidentialBalance 0x00000080
  • lsifMPTCanHoldConfidentialBalance 0x00000080 (ImmutableFlags)
  • tfMPTSetCanHoldConfidentialBalance 0x00000100
  • tifMPTCanHoldConfidentialBalance 0x00000080

Result codes

  • temMALFORMED
  • temBAD_CIPHERTEXT
  • temBAD_TRANSFER_FEE
  • tecBAD_PROOF
  • tecNO_PERMISSION
  • tecNO_AUTH
  • tecINSUFFICIENT_FUNDS
  • tecLOCKED
  • tecOBJECT_NOT_FOUND

Invariants

  • ConfidentialOutstandingAmount is between zero and OutstandingAmount.
  • Convert and ConvertBack change the confidential total by exactly the opposite change in the public MPT amount.
  • Confidential holder fields and the issuer's encrypted counterpart must exist together.
  • Holder-initiated deletion of an MPToken with confidential balance fields is blocked while the issuance's ConfidentialOutstandingAmount is nonzero. Implicit vault or loan-broker cleanup blocks those fields regardless of that total.

What does a concrete workflow look like?

A holder converts a public MPT amount into an encrypted inbox balance, merges it into the spending balance, and sends it with a proof. The recipient decrypts the amount; observers verify proofs and public supply rules while seeing participant accounts and any public conversion amounts.

How does this amendment relate to others?

Every direct relationship has a type, an explanation and a primary source.

What happens next for this amendment?

ConfidentialTransfer is open for Mainnet voting but is not enabled yet. The latest response reports support from 21 of 35 tracked validators.

Activation requires support strictly above 80 percent for two uninterrupted weeks. A reported raw cutoff is not the minimum yes-vote count: with 35 tracked validators and a cutoff of 28, at least 29 yes votes are required.

Where does it sit within its amendment family?

Multi-Purpose Tokens: protocol progression

  1. DeletableAccountsEnabled · from rippled 1.4.0
  2. TicketBatchEnabled · from rippled 1.7.0
  3. DisallowIncomingEnabled · from rippled 1.10.0
  4. fixDisallowIncomingV1Enabled · from rippled 2.0.0
  5. MPTokensV1Enabled · from rippled 2.3.0
  6. PermissionedDEXEnabled · from rippled 2.5.0
  7. TokenEscrowEnabled · from rippled 2.5.0
  8. PermissionDelegationDeprecated · from rippled 2.5.0
  9. fixTokenEscrowV1Enabled · from rippled 3.0.0
  10. fixMPTDeliveredAmountEnabled · from rippled 3.0.0
  11. fixCleanup3_2_0Enabled · from xrpld 3.2.0
  12. DynamicMPTOpen for voting · from xrpld 3.3.0
  13. SponsorOpen for voting · from xrpld 3.3.0
  14. ConfidentialTransferOpen for voting · from xrpld 3.3.0
  15. PermissionDelegationV1_1Enabled · from xrpld 3.3.0
  16. fixCleanup3_4_0Enabled · from xrpld 3.4.0
  17. MPTokensV2In development

Which primary sources support this information?

← All XRPL amendments and XLS specifications