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Not a network amendmentTier BUpcoming standardsSpec: Draft

Firewall XLS-86

A draft for an outgoing destination allowlist, counterparty approval, a backup account, and an account-wide fee limit. This is a proposal, not an active network feature. Whether any part of it will launch, and when, remains open.

Sources reviewed Oct 5, 2026 · English page updated Oct 5, 2026 · Phil · CryptoTuts founder

Network status
Not a network amendment
XLS
XLS-86
Spec status
Draft
Spec revision
Sep 19, 2025

What does this XLS propose?

What problem is the proposal intended to solve?

A stolen master or regular key can currently transfer an account's spendable value quickly. Multisigning can help but is not the same as a permanently enforced recipient allowlist with a fee ceiling.

How is the mechanism designed in the current draft?

FirewallSet links the protected account to Counterparty and Backup and can set MaxFee. WithdrawPreauth creates jointly authorized recipient approvals. Preclaim checks reject blocked operations, unapproved checked destinations, or excessive fees with tefFIREWALL_BLOCK. Changes and deletion need counterparty approval. The draft allows Clawback and AMMClawback, but its VaultClawback block conflicts with its broader issuer-rights claim.

How settled is the proposal?

This is a proposal, not an active network feature. Whether any part of it will launch, and when, remains open.

What changes compared with the predecessor?

BeforeAfter
A valid account key could determine outgoing destinations and transaction fees without an additional protocol approval.A protected account could pay only approved recipients and submit no transaction above its MaxFee.

Who is this change relevant to?

XRP holders and users

A user could preapprove recipients and limit fee abuse. Without counterparty cooperation, approvals or MaxFee cannot later be expanded.

Wallets and app developers

Wallets must show firewall status, permitted destinations, Backup, counterparty signatures, and possible blocking by MaxFee before signing.

Exchanges and issuers

Treasury accounts could restrict withdrawals to known destinations. The draft explicitly allows Clawback and AMMClawback, while its treatment of VaultClawback remains inconsistent with its general issuer-rights wording.

Node operators

Before applying each account transaction, nodes would need to check the fee ceiling and, for relevant types, the destination.

What limitations and risks remain?

  • XLS-86 is a draft, not an active protection feature.
  • MaxFee applies uniformly to all outgoing transactions and cannot vary by transaction type.
  • If network fees rise above MaxFee, all transactions are blocked until the limit is raised with counterparty approval.
  • A compromised or unreachable counterparty cannot make changes alone but can permanently refuse legitimate changes.
  • The firewall permits specified account-management and system operations, plus Clawback and AMMClawback. The draft table blocks VaultClawback despite broader wording that issuer rights cannot be blocked.
  • MaxFee limits transaction fees, not the XRP reserve.
  • Each recipient approval requires reserve; the practical number is limited by reserve and the owner directory.

What fee and performance figures does the specification provide?

  • The firewall itself and WithdrawPreauth entries require owner reserves. According to the draft, creation requires reserve for two objects.
  • The MaxFee check is intended to run first as a cheap check before more complex firewall rules are evaluated.
Technical details: transactions, fields, codes and invariants

Transactions

  • FirewallSet
  • FirewallDelete
  • WithdrawPreauth
  • all outgoing transactions subject to MaxFee checks

Ledger objects

  • Firewall (LedgerEntryType 0x0085)
  • WithdrawPreauth (LedgerEntryType 0x0856)

Fields and flags

  • FirewallID / Counterparty / Backup
  • CounterpartySignature
  • MaxFee
  • Authorize / Unauthorize
  • Firewall key space 0x0046 / WithdrawPreauth key space 0x0047

Result codes

  • tefFIREWALL_BLOCK
  • temDISABLED / temINVALID_FLAG / temMALFORMED
  • temBAD_SIGNATURE / temINVALID_ACCOUNT_ID / temCANNOT_PREAUTH_SELF
  • tecDUPLICATE / tecNO_DST / tecNO_TARGET / tecNO_ENTRY
  • tecNO_PERMISSION / tecINSUFFICIENT_RESERVE / tecDIR_FULL

How does this proposal relate to others?

Every direct relationship has a type, an explanation and a primary source.

No direct family relationship supported by reliable evidence is recorded for this proposal. The page deliberately avoids showing an assumed connection.

What happens next for this proposal?

This is a proposal, not an active network feature. Whether any part of it will launch, and when, remains open.

The draft needs further technical development and may still change fundamentally or be abandoned. Only a corresponding xrpld (formerly rippled) amendment would trigger a separate network vote.

Where does it sit within its amendment family?

Firewall has no amendment family with other members on this site, so there is no progression to show here.

Which primary sources support this information?

← All XRPL amendments and XLS specifications